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Cornhusker Economics
Role of Social Networks and Individual Endowments in
Meeting Fundraising Targets: An Economic Experiment
Market Report
Livestock and Products,
Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .
Choice Boxed Beef,
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn,
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crops,
Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
Nebraska City, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
Nebraska City, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales,
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
⃰ No Market

Year
Ago

4 Wks
Ago

3-25-16

165.72

132.00

*

280.75

198.24

193.84

220.64

165.76

158.93

248.92

226.24

226.62

55.83

51.55

61.97

66.49

69.65

76.02

144.21

143.71

132.01

370.66

359.79

346.31

5.03

3.93

3.87

3.75

3.33

3.42

9.22

8.21

8.56

7.79

5.48

5.61

3.07

2.66

2.42

175.00

250.00

200.00

77.50

82.50

77.50

105.00

85.00

85.00

174.25

134.50

127.50

57.00

51.50

52.00

Social networks have widespread influence by virtue
of the easy and often low-cost manner in which information is transmitted through them. For example,
they can enable diffusion of pro-social behaviors and
production of public benefits as evidenced by the
fantastic success of the Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) Ice Bucket Challenge. Recently, the ALS
Society announced that the funds generated through
the campaign helped pursue high-risk research and
produced scientific breakthroughs (Washington Post
2015). Against the backdrop of such successful initiatives, our research investigates the role of information obtained about charitable giving behavior of
one’s social connections on fundraising success, specifically in situations where funding campaigns involve predetermined targets and where donors have
different levels of endowments from which they make
their charitable contributions.
Our focus on such funding targets is motivated by
the fact that in many situations public benefits or
goods may only be feasibly provided in discrete
quantities or when a particular threshold is reached.
In some instances, if funds raised are not sufficient to
meet this threshold, the project is not implemented.
Also, in the case of many crowd-funding sites, the
total money raised gets transferred to the individuals
only when a predefined target is met.
For this study, we conduct human subject laboratory
economic experiments. These experiments involve
controlled settings in which randomly selected student subjects make decisions under different experimental conditions on the basis of which they are
paid. By varying the incentives associated with each
decision, it is possible for the experimenter to evaluate different types of behaviors under conditions re-
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presentative of realistic environments in which fundraising
activities are implemented. Experiments are specifically
suited for this study since they can indicate how different
behaviors dynamically spread on the network, which is
difficult to isolate from observational field data. Moreover,
in real life, people’s peer groups change over time so the
experimental setting can provide a benchmark framework
for studying behavior in situations where people’s networks and peer groups remain unchanged.

Table 1: Experimental Design
Informa on
Endowment
Level

LOCAL‐Info

COMPLETE‐Info

LOW

LOW‐LOCAL
(6 groups)

LOW‐COMPLETE
(6 groups)

HIGH

HIGH‐LOCAL
(6 groups)

HIGH‐COMPLETE
(6 groups)

Experimental Design:
We collected data from 144 student subjects (24 experimental groups in total) who were recruited from the broad
undergraduate student population of Indiana University
Bloomington. The experiment involved groups of six people who individually decided how much of their endowment of “tokens” (they received each round) they would
contribute for public good provision. The public good was
produced if and only if the group as a whole contributed
120 tokens. If the target was not reached, all the tokens
were fully refunded back to the group members. The group
as a whole earned less (and thus enjoyed less benefits) if the
public good was not funded. Individual payoffs were determined based on the number of tokens retained in one’s
personal fund and the total benefit generated if the public
good was provided.
During these experiments, we varied the information available to subjects through their social networks in two ways:


In the 12 groups termed LOCAL, the social network
involved every person having two neighbors (one to
their left and other to their right) from whom they received individual contribution information.



In the remaining 12 groups termed COMPLETE, all
six people were connected to each other and so they
received contribution information from every group
member.

Figure 1 presents these two network structures. Additionally, we varied subjects’ endowment levels to represent the
fact that in real life, different people have different endowments and hence different abilities to contribute to the
public good. In 12 groups termed LOW, subjects had an
endowment of 30 tokens. In the remaining groups termed
HIGH, subjects were endowed with 50 tokens. As a result
of this design specification, we had four types of experimental treatments presented in Table 1.

Each experiment session had three parts. In Part I, the
subjects participated in a practice round with no feedback on decisions made by other participants. In Parts
II and III, they interacted with their group members 20
times or for 20 periods during which they decided how
much to contribute to the public good. The first 10 periods (in Part II) served as a baseline during which everyone received aggregate information about the total
amount of tokens contributed to the public good (once
everyone had made their contributions from their endowment). In the remaining 10 periods (Part III), treatment specific (LOCAL or COMPLETE) information
was provided. This repeated interaction setting is important for multiple reasons. First, it facilitates people’s
understanding of the experimental environment so that
data collected is a result of systematic deliberation rather than of idiosyncratic decisions. Second, it provides
evidence about how individuals learn and respond to
non-monetary dynamic incentives such as reputation
amongst one’s peers, in different economic environments.
Results:
Figure 2 presents the performance of the groups in
terms of whether they are able to meet the funding
threshold or not. Comparing the size of the grey and
black bars in Part II and Part III, our first result is that
HIGH-endowment groups (right set of graphs) are
more likely to reach the threshold than LOWendowment ones (left set of graphs). Figure 3 plots the
average group contributions across all 20 periods of the
game. The graphs indicate that in the later periods of
Phase III, success depends upon the amount of information received about others’ actions – groups are
more likely to meet the target when people have information about everyone’s contributions i.e., under the
COMPLETE condition than under the LOCAL one.
This finding is corroborated by statistical analysis.

Implication: Thus, funding agencies are more likely to

Figure 1: LOCAL and COMPLETE Informa on Networks

be successful in communities where people are not constrained by their endowments (of income or time relative to the funding threshold) or the information they
receive about the giving behaviors of their social con-

nections. With more of both, the public good has a higher
likelihood of being provided.

mation exchange between as many community members as possible.

Second, focusing only on the behavior of low endowment
groups represented by the grey bars in the left panel of Figure 2, we find a statistically significant treatment effect
(between LOW-LOCAL and LOW-COMPLETE conditions). Thus, when groups are constrained by their endowments, information about giving behavior of more peers
increases the chances of reaching funding targets, relative
to situations where people have information about fewer
contacts.

Finally, in Figure 3 we also observe that there is less variability across periods i.e., fewer instances where groups
fall short of or overshoot the threshold, in the COMPLETE sessions (solid line) than in the LOCAL ones
(dashed line) irrespective of the endowment value.
Overshooting the threshold leads to inefficiency since
tokens contributed above 120 are lost (and don’t accrue
any income) and undershooting means the group forgoes the benefits derived from the public good.

Implication: Thus when running fundraising campaigns in

Implication: Thus, devising mechanisms to provide

communities where people have lower endowments (of
time or money), funders may be able to significantly increase chances of fundraising success by facilitating infor-

people with giving information about all their group
members can benefit both funders and donors by reducing wasteful contributions beyond the threshold.

Figure 2: Percentage of Groups Mee ng the Threshold with LOW & HIGH Endowments in Part II & Part III

Figure 3: Mean Group Contribu ons in the Repeated Game in LOW and HIGH Treatments

Conclusions and Next steps:
Our study results indicate that success of fundraising outcomes depends both on the nature of social connections
that determine the amount of information available about
other’s giving behaviors as well as the endowments from
which people make their donations. Thus, a key lesson from
our study is that fundraising is not a one-size-fits-all endeavor. If funding organizations want to streamline their
activities to achieve their targets at the lowest possible costs,
they should be mindful of the donor demographic and the
nature of community relations.

At this point, we caution the reader about extrapolating
the results of this controlled and stylized study to real
life settings. The goal of laboratory experiments is to
provide important benchmark results that establish
proof of concept and internal theoretical validity of the
mechanisms studied. For external validity, greater generalizability and eventual policy implementation, experimentation in other related settings and with a nonstudent subject pool is essential. This is the subject
matter of current ongoing research.
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